Nine Years After Grenfell: No Prosecutions Yet - But Residents’ Bills Keep Rising
- Mar 2
- 11 min read
Updated: Mar 4
03 March 2026 | By Ben Falconer
On 14 June 2017, a blaze in a West London tower killed 72 people: 70 died at the scene, and 2 later in hospital. Grenfell was the deadliest structural fire in the UK since the 1988 Piper Alpha Oil Platform disaster and the worst residential fire since World War 2.
The minimum expectation we have for our homes is that they are safe. Yet as we sit here in 2026, those developers responsible have still not had charges brought against them, nor has the criminal investigation concluded.
Meanwhile, affected residents are footing the bill for temporary safety measures while they wait for remedial works to begin - absorbing sharply inflated insurance premiums and paying for additional compliance requirements that have emerged in the wake of the disaster.
Aside from the financial burden, the cost to families and friends who lost loved ones is immeasurable. The Metropolitan Police have indicated their investigation could take close to a decade to complete, with corporate manslaughter, gross negligence manslaughter and health and safety offences among those under consideration.
However, the public inquiry has already reached detailed conclusions about how the fire spread.
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry examined the refurbishment, the materials used and the regulatory framework surrounding the building.
Its Phase 2 report set out clearly that ACM rainscreen panels with polyethylene cores acted as fuel, with combustible insulation materials contributing to the rapid spread of flames up, down and around the structure.
That finding matters because it moves the fire from the realm of accident into the realm of decision-making.
Once the materials are identified, the focus shifts to how they were specified, approved and signed off. It raises questions about regulation, oversight, product testing and responsibility - not just about what happened on the night, but about the chain of choices that led there.
And that leaves a question that has not diminished with time:
How did materials capable of burning like that end up wrapped around people’s homes in the first place?
Findings from the 2024 Inquiry
That question is precisely what the Grenfell Tower Inquiry set out to examine.
Its Phase 2 report, published on 4 September 2024, analysed the refurbishment, the materials used, the regulatory oversight and the decision-making processes that allowed those materials to be installed. The report made 58 recommendations aimed at preventing a repeat of the disaster.
Below is a summary of the Inquiry’s findings on how combustible materials came to be used as cladding:
1. Cost-driven material changes
The refurbishment of Grenfell (2012–2016) involved value engineering decisions.
The Inquiry found that:
The original design proposals were changed.
A cheaper ACM panel with a polyethylene core was selected.
The polyethylene-cored version was significantly less fire-resistant than alternative options.
Cost pressure was a factor in those substitutions. The Inquiry concluded that the choice of materials was influenced by budget considerations during the refurbishment process.
Misleading product testing and marketing
The Inquiry found serious issues with how some cladding products were marketed and tested.
It concluded that:
Certain manufacturers presented fire test data in a way that created a misleading impression of safety.
Marketing materials did not always reflect the limitations of fire performance testing.
In some cases, test results were used outside the context in which they were valid.
This contributed to confusion within the construction industry about what complied with building regulations and what did not, allowing materials to be specified and approved under interpretations that later proved dangerously flawed.
3. A broken regulatory framework
The Inquiry was critical of the building regulations regime in place at the time. It found:
Guidance was unclear and open to interpretation.
The regulatory system relied heavily on professional judgment.
There was insufficient oversight of how compliance was demonstrated.
Approved Document B (fire safety guidance) was described as unclear in parts.
In short: The system allowed combustible materials to be used in high-rise buildings under certain interpretations.
4. Failures in oversight and building control
The Inquiry examined:
The role of building control
The approval process
How compliance was assessed
It found that:
There were failures in scrutiny.
Some assumptions were made about compliance without full technical justification.
The system relied on declarations and documentation that were not always rigorously interrogated.
5. A culture of complacency about fire risk in external walls
Perhaps most significantly, the Inquiry concluded that: There was a widespread industry assumption that the risk of external wall fire spread in high-rise residential buildings was low. This assumption shaped:
Design decisions
Regulatory interpretation
Risk assessment
Enforcement culture
Once it became clear that external wall risk had been underestimated, the response rippled far beyond just Grenfell. It reshaped how similar homes were valued, financed and sold.
EWS1: How a Safety Crisis Became a Lending Crisis
Once it became clear that the risk of external wall fire spread had been badly underestimated, the consequences did not stop with regulation.
They moved into the financial system.
If the construction industry had misjudged the risk, lenders were not prepared to do the same. The response was immediate and defensive. Buildings that had once been treated as routine residential assets were suddenly viewed through a different lens: fire exposure, liability and uncertainty.
This is where EWS1 forms (External Wall System fire reviews) enters the story.
Government-published lender data explains that EWS1 forms were developed by RICS, UK Finance and the Building Societies Association to support mortgage valuation decisions on flats. Crucially, an EWS1 is not a government requirement, and it is not a building or life safety assessment.
In many cases, without an EWS1 form, a buyer could not secure a mortgage - and without a mortgage, most sales simply collapsed. That meant owners could not sell, remortgage or release equity unless their building could produce the required certification.
So while EWS1 was not written into law as mandatory, in the real world it often determined whether a flat could be bought or sold at all.
Flats that had previously been treated as mortgageable residential homes were suddenly classed as high risk assets. Many lenders refused to lend. Without mortgage finance, the pool of potential buyers shrank dramatically.
When mortgage buyers disappear from the market, sellers are left relying on cash purchasers and cash buyers typically demand significant discounts.
In practical terms, that meant many leaseholders were forced to accept steep discounts if they wanted, or needed to sell.
Market reports and leaseholder accounts during the height of the crisis showed flats in affected buildings selling for 20% to 40% below pre-Grenfell valuations where buyers could only proceed in cash. In some cases, properties were temporarily valued at £0 for mortgage purposes, effectively rendering them unsellable on the open market.
Even where buildings were later deemed lower risk, uncertainty alone suppressed value. Buyers factored in the possibility of remediation works, future levies or ongoing insurance inflation. Risk was priced in.
For homeowners who had bought in good faith, often with significant leverage, that shift wasn’t abstract. It meant:
Negative equity.
Inability to refinance.
Inability to move for work or family reasons.
The Rising Cost of Simply Staying Put
If EWS1 affected what a flat was worth, Building safety compliance, rising insurance premiums, waking watch charges and new Building Safety Act requirements affected how much it cost to live there each month.
Even for owners who had no intention of selling, the financial impact did not stop. It moved from the sale price of their home to the money leaving their bank account every month through higher service charges.
This is the part nobody budgets for: the safety surcharge inside service charges.
When a building is flagged as higher risk, costs do not wait for investigations to conclude or liability to be settled. They appear immediately through the service charge.
And they rarely arrive as a single, obvious bill. Instead, they are absorbed into multiple line items: insurance, interim safety measures, professional fees, compliance documentation, fire risk reassessments. Charges that are difficult to challenge, impossible to shop around for, and mandatory under the lease.
For many residents, the market value of their home was hit first. Then the monthly outgoings followed.
Average service charge per leaseholder (2017 → 2025)
Source: Hamptons Service Charge Index
The Hamptons Service Charge Index shows average annual service charges rising from £1,350 in 2017 to £2,405 in 2024/25: a 78% increase.
However, inflation over the same period was approximately 30–35%. Adjusted for inflation, £1,350 in 2017 would equate to roughly £1,800 today.
That means current average charges are around £600 per year higher than inflation alone would explain.
The increase cannot be attributed to rising prices generally. Structural cost pressures are embedded in the system.
It’s important to note that this dataset reflects average service charges across a broad sample of estates in England and Wales. It is not limited to buildings affected by unsafe cladding, EWS1 issues or interim fire safety measures.
In practice, service charges in buildings directly affected by cladding remediation or interim fire safety measures are frequently much higher than the market-wide average shown here.
Building insurance (2017 → 2020)
Source: FCA - Report on Insurance for Multi Occupancy Buildings
Insurance is not optional. It is a legal and operational requirement for residential blocks. When insurers reassess risk, residents feel it immediately.
The FCA’s review of multi-occupancy residential building insurance found that mean annual premiums for mid-rise and high-rise buildings increased sharply between 2016 and 2021.
For buildings identified as having flammable cladding, the increase was even steeper. The mean premium rose from £30,000 in 2017 to £75,600 in 2021, an increase of approximately 152%.
That is not marginal inflation.That is the repricing of risk.
That increase does not sit with the freeholder. It is recovered through the service charge and divided between leaseholders.
And unlike property values, which may rise and fall over time, insurance is an annual bill that has to be paid in full, every year.
Building Safety Act Compliance: A New and Rising Cost
Alongside insurance, another charge has begun appearing in service charge budgets: Building Safety Act compliance.
These are not remediation bills. They are the costs of operating under the post-Grenfell regulatory regime.
Higher-risk buildings must now be registered with the Building Safety Regulator. They require formal safety case reports, documented risk assessments, accountable persons with legal duties and ongoing compliance management. In practice, this often means external fire engineers, consultants and specialist advisors being retained on a continuing basis. And the cost is not static.
The Property Institute’s Service Charge Index shows Building Safety Act compliance costs rising sharply as the regime beds in. Average compliance costs per estate increased from approximately £5,812 in 2023 to £28,694 in 2024: thats a 394% increase in 1 year.
For in-scope buildings, that equates to just over £177 per leaseholder on average.
On its own, £177 may not sound dramatic. But it represents something structurally new. It is not the cost of fixing unsafe cladding. It is the cost of proving and maintaining safety under a tighter regulatory system. And like insurance, it is not a one-off, its an ongoing cost for residents throughout the lifetime of their ownership.
For many leaseholders, that means paying for a regulatory framework created in response to industry and regulatory failings they did not design, approve or benefit from.
Temporary Measures: Paying Every Month With No Clear End
For many residents, the financial impact did not begin with remediation works. It began with interim safety measures.
When a building was assessed as posing an increased fire risk, temporary arrangements were often introduced while longer term solutions were planned. One of the most common was a waking watch. This involves trained personnel patrolling the building around the clock to identify signs of fire and raise the alarm.
The National Audit Office reports that in 2020 the median cost of a waking watch was £11,361 per building per month. That equated to approximately £137 per home each month. Even in 2023, buildings receiving support through the Waking Watch Relief Fund were still seeing average costs of around £104 per home per month.
They are recurring monthly costs added to service charges while residents wait for remediation to begin or complete.
In practice, these costs were passed to leaseholders through service charges, since interim safety measures are typically recoverable under the terms of the lease, regardless of who may ultimately be responsible for the defects.
For a leaseholder paying £120 per month, that amounts to more than £1,400 per year on top of existing service charges and mortgage payments. And in some buildings, waking watch arrangements remained in place for extended periods.
While a £30 million Waking Watch Relief Fund was created to assist a few hundred buildings, thousands more affected blocks fell outside its scope, leaving most residents to continue covering interim safety costs themselves.
But Aren’t Leaseholders Protected Now?
Government guidance for England sets out clear protections, but they are not absolute. It states that:
Qualifying leaseholders are protected from paying for cladding system remediation.
They may still be required, subject to caps and conditions, to contribute toward certain non-cladding defects and interim safety measures such as waking watch.
Non-qualifying leaseholders may remain liable, depending on their circumstances and whether the building owner is linked to the original developer.
So the reality is more nuanced than a simple yes or no.
For many leaseholders, cladding replacement costs are restricted. But the broader financial ecosystem created around safety, interim measures, insurance repricing, compliance obligations, still results in additional charges appearing in service charge budgets.
Conclusion: The Price of Systemic Failure
The Inquiry has described how combustible materials were selected, approved and installed. It has outlined systemic failures in regulation, oversight and industry culture. It has made recommendations designed to prevent a repeat.
But nearly a decade on, two realities sit side by side.
Accountability is still working its way through the criminal justice system with no updates to the public since 2024.
And the financial consequences have already been and continue to be absorbed by residents. Homeowners has been left with the financial burden of the aftermath.
Flats lost value. Sales collapsed. Insurance premiums surged. Compliance costs multiplied. Interim safety measures were funded month after month while remediation moved slowly through design, procurement and dispute.
The cost of that correction has not been borne solely by those responsible. It has been spread across leaseholders through higher service charges, insurance premiums and compliance costs.
For many homeowners, this was not speculation. It was negative equity. It was stalled life plans. It was money leaving their accounts every month to manage risks they did not create.
Grenfell exposed catastrophic failure in how buildings were designed, regulated and approved.
Nearly nine years later, the question is no longer only how it happened. It is who has paid for the consequences. And for many residents across the country, the answer is already clear.
Sources
BBC News - criminal investigation timeline, no charges expected until late 2026 at earliest (as of May 2024).
GOV.UK - publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report (final report published 4 Sept 2024).
Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report (Vol 2) - findings on how the external wall system contributed to rapid fire spread.
The Property Institute - Service Charge Index (April 2024): multi-year service charge totals and category breakdowns.
National Audit Office - dangerous cladding remediation portfolio: waking watch costs, insurance pressure, leaseholder impacts.
GOV.UK - remediation costs guidance (England): what qualifying leaseholders do/do not pay.
FCA - insurance for multi-occupancy buildings (premium increases, cladding vs non-cladding).
GOV.UK - EWS1 lender valuation data (Oct–Dec 2024): how often EWS1 is still being required.
Hamptons - Service Charge Index 2024 (useful secondary chart to show national averages 2019→2024).
Who should ultimately bear the cost of post-Grenfell building safety reforms?
Developers and contractors involved in original install
Product manufacturers
Building owners / freeholders
Government through public funds
About the author
Written by the team at Planex Controls. We publish opinion pieces and detailed investigative analysis on the construction and engineering industries - bringing to light practices that aren’t right, and breaking complex scenarios down into clear, plain English.
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